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Abstract 
This empirical study analyses the effects of the introduction of strongly increased 
disclosure requirements in Germany on the level of executive compensation. One 
innovative aspect is the comparison of companies which voluntarily followed a 
recommendation of the German Governance Code before the relevant law was 
implemented and published detailed information on executive compensation with 
other firms which did not. Conditional and unconditional quantile difference-in-
differences models are estimated. The companies which refused to publish data 
before it became mandatory show a reduction in compensation levels for the upper 
quantiles. Hence, the mandatory requirement to publish detailed information 
reduced the higher levels of executive compensations, but did not affect executive 
compensation at lower or medium levels.  
 
 
JEL-Codes: M52, M48, G38, L20, C31 
Key words: Executive Compensation, Disclosure Obligations, Corporate Governance  
  Regulation, Policy Evaluation, Quantile Treatment Effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: We are very grateful to the Kienbaum Consulting AG for the kind provision of 
extensive data on management compensation. We also thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
for financial support via SFB 823 ”Statistical modelling of nonlinear dynamic processes”. 
  
** TU Dortmund, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences, Vogelpothsweg 87, D-44227 
Dortmund, katharina.dyballa@tu-dortmund.de (corresponding author). 
*** TU Dortmund, Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Science, Vogelpothsweg 87, D-44227 
Dortmund, ZEW Mannheim and IZA Bonn, kornelius.kraft@tu-dortmund.de 
                                                          
2 
 
1 Introduction 
Most of the literature on executive compensation does not consider institutional factors like 
legislative interventions. Murphy (2013) criticizes this neglect and mentions disclosure 
requirements as one example of legislative action1. Disclosure requirements might well affect 
the total level of compensation as well as variable and fixed components. At least one might 
argue that this is what politicians have in mind when they introduce such requirements and it 
might be interesting to test whether its purpose is achieved. Although one of the aims is 
probably to limit management compensation, the effect is a priori unclear. 
On the one hand, disclosure might have a leveling effect on executive compensation.  Higher 
transparency is supposed to lower the shareholders’ cost of monitoring the setting of 
executive compensation. This, in turn, might increase the directors’ need to justify their 
choice of compensation structures, which might put pressure on inappropriately high 
executive compensation levels. 
Furthermore, detailed information about an executive’s compensation might cause an outrage 
constraint (negative reactions from interested parties such as institutional investors or 
professional colleagues, whose views are not unimportant to executives). Consequently, if 
managers care about their reputation they might be reluctant to ask for inappropriately high 
compensation levels (e.g. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Iacobucci (1998), Gordon (2005)).  
Whereas in Germany information about compensation was previously published as an 
aggregated sum to include all board members, current disclosure requirements demand that 
remuneration details are provided for each individual by name. This offers the popular media 
an opportunity to disseminate such data and they will focus in particular on high 
compensation levels, irrespective of the performance of an executive. High income is 
frequently regarded in public debate as dubious and unjustified. This may well exert some 
pressure on the payment of high executive compensation, but probably not on low or medium 
level remunerations.   
Therefore, assuming that board members care about the views of professional groups, their 
public reputation and the respect of the shareholders, they might be reluctant to ask for 
inappropriately high compensation levels (e.g. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Iacobucci 
(1998), Gordon (2005)). 
On the other hand, stricter disclosure obligations may lead to higher executive pay levels. An 
increase in transparency could lead to a shift from fixed to variable compensation in order to 
1 Murphy (2013) chronologically describes reasons and reactions for several changes in US disclosure 
obligations over the last decades.  
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“hide” the high level of overall compensation in incentive-orientated pay2. Furthermore, 
higher transparency might imply a “ratcheting-up” effect, i.e. an increase in total 
compensation due to the availability of detailed information about the compensation levels at 
rival companies. Additionally, managers might regard the disclosure requirement as a way to 
signal to the management labor market high productivity by high compensation (e.g. 
Iacobucci (1998), Alarie (2003), Gordon (2005)).    
Obviously, from a theoretical point of view, there are divergent hypotheses suggesting either 
an increase or a decrease in executive compensation as a result of stricter publication 
obligations. However, there are only a few studies which empirically investigate the impact of 
changes in disclosure rules on executive compensation. Most of the studies focus rather on 
pay-sensitivity than on absolute level of compensation.  
Using New Zealand data, Andjelkovic et al. (2002) analyze executive compensation during 
the first year of mandatory pay disclosure rules and find no evidence of an increase in pay-
performance sensitivity. Craighead et al. (2004) use Canadian policy changes in compensation 
disclosure in order to evaluate the impact on performance-based compensation. They find that 
mandatory disclosure obligations have a larger impact on the executive compensation in 
widely held firms than in closely held firms. This implies that pay-performance sensitivity 
increases more in less monitored (widely held) firms than in better monitored (closely held) 
firms. Clarkson et al. (2011) use Australian data and similarly they empirically detect an 
increase in pay-performance relation due to regulatory changes in disclosure requirements.  
We use changes in German mandatory publication as a natural experiment in order to 
discover the causal effect on the level of executive compensation.  Until 2005 Germany’s 
mandatory disclosure requirements concerning executive compensation were rather lax and 
vague, especially by international standards3. Back then stock listed companies were merely 
obliged to publish the total amount of compensation aggregated for the whole executive 
board. Starting in 2002, in an attempt to increase transparency around compensation, the 
German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) introduced recommendations on publishing 
individual compensation levels and the components in the annual reports. Due to the fact that 
only a fraction of all companies followed the recommendations voluntarily by publishing 
2 The variable part might be designed in a way that the specified aims for management are normally reached and 
therefor the bonus is usually payed out.  
3 Fernandes et al. (2013) give an overview of the introduction of compensation disclosure laws across different 
countries. Accordingly, the US implemented mandatory disclosure obligation in 1934 (extended in the following 
years). In the following years many other countries followed by introducing similar mandatory disclosure rules 
including: Canada in 1993, UK in 1995, Ireland and South Africa in 2000; Australia in 2004, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden, Norway and partly Switzerland in 2006. 
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detailed information on executive compensation, a new law, the Act on the Disclosure of 
Management Board Compensation4 (VorstOG5), was implemented in 2006.  
The VorstOG introduced mandatory disclosure obligations to improve information on 
compensation. Since then stock companies have been legally compelled to publish executive 
compensation differentiated according to its components and on an individualized level. 
Furthermore, the law introduces the mandatory disclosure of stock options. The main 
argument of German legislation put forward to justify the implementation of stricter 
mandatory disclosure obligations was to protect shareholders’ interests. The legislation was 
based on the assumption that better information on remuneration encourages shareholders to 
represent their interest towards managers more efficiently.  
German legislation (with its initially voluntary disclosure recommendations and later 
mandatory rules) provides an interesting setting to use a difference-in-differences approach in 
order to evaluate the causal impact of changes in mandatory disclosure on executive 
compensation. Firms which followed the voluntary recommendations are compared with 
those which did not in order to test for possible differences between these firm types. 
Furthermore, due to the fact that we assume that the impact of policy change may differ 
across the compensation distribution we extend the standard difference-in-differences 
approach to conditional and unconditional quantile regression.  
For our empirical analysis we use panel data from 84 stock listed German companies covering 
the years from 2002 to 2011. Our dataset includes information on total compensation per head 
(provided by Kienbaum), company financials (dafne) and corporate governance information 
(self-collected).  
Our main findings reveal a decrease in total compensation as a result of the implementation of 
the VorstOG, which is in line with our main hypothesis claiming that higher transparency 
might intensify shareholders’ opportunities to monitor the supervisory board’s compensation 
setting and/or an outrage constraint on managers. Interestingly, the leveling effects are merely 
significant in the upper part of the compensation distribution. 
Both the extent of compensation reduction and its statistical significance support our 
hypothesis, suggesting that companies in the upper part of the compensation distribution are 
in general more likely to be subject to public scrutiny and thus also experience higher 
pressure.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the German board 
system and provides an overview of German changes regarding mandatory disclosure 
4 § 285 (9) HGB (German Commercial Code) 
5 Vorstandsvergütungsoffenlegungsgesetz 
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obligations. Section 3 summarizes current literature and develops our main hypothesis. 
Information on the data and identification strategy is provided in section 4, followed by the 
presentation of our empirical results in section 5. We finish this paper with a conclusion in 
section 6. 
 
2 The German board model and disclosure obligations 
Executive compensation is a highly discussed topic – both politically and in the media. The 
standard conflict between managers and shareholders, based among other things on the 
assumptions of managers, who maximize short-term interests, and shareholders, who follow 
long-term interests. This problem is usually analyzed by applying a principal-agent model. In 
such a context the shareholder (principal) engages a manager (agent) to act in his or her 
interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, due to the well-known problem of asymmetric 
information, managers could use their discretionary power for opportunistic behavior to 
maximize their own utility to the disadvantage of the shareholders. One of the general aims in 
corporate governance is to minimize managerial opportunistic behavior by implementing 
several governance tools. The German two tier board system6, for example, implements a 
control institution – the supervisory board – with the explicit task of controlling executives to 
ensure that shareholders’ interests are upheld. Amongst other issues, the supervisory board is 
responsible for setting the management compensation. Thus, management compensation 
could serve as an instrument to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests by setting 
adequate monetary incentives. 
However, the composition of the supervisory board does not always reflect the interests of the 
shareholders. Only a minority of supervisory boards include one or more shareholders as 
members. The members are mostly executives from other companies or from banks. Friendly 
relationships between executives and supervisory board members or interlocked board 
memberships raise the question as to what extent shareholders’ interests are adequately 
represented by supervisory board members. Therefore it is unclear whether the supervisory 
boards always control executives efficiently and set compensation in an optimal way. To the 
detriment of the shareholders, managers and supervisory board members might even share 
similar interests (that differ from those of the shareholders),  resulting in inappropriately high 
compensation levels (Bitter, 2005).  
6 In contrast to the American one tier system a dual board system differentiates between the management board 
and the supervisory board. The former has the task of managing the company, whereas the latter is supposed to 
supervise and advise the management board.  
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In order to improve the corporate governance structure and thus the representation of 
shareholders’ interests, German legislation implemented the German Corporate Governance 
Code (GCGC) in 20027. This code is based on the concept of “soft laws” including proposals 
and recommendations aiming for a more transparent and comprehensible German corporate 
governance system. According to §161 of the German Stock Corporation Act, listed stock 
companies must annually confirm that they comply with the recommendations of the GCGC 
by publishing a declaration of compliance attached to their annual report. In case of deviation 
companies are additionally obliged to mention the reason for this.  
With regard to executive compensation German legislation previously required only that 
companies report the overall compensation for the management board as a whole. In order to 
increase transparency the GCGC recommended the detailed disclosure of management 
compensation, thus, §4.2.4 of the code (GCGC 2005) states: 
 
“Compensation of the members of the Management Board shall be reported in the Notes of 
the Consolidated Financial Statements subdivided according to fixed, performance-related 
and long-term incentive components. The figures shall be individualized.” 
 
Since the Code’s adoption in 2002, empirical evidence shows that several companies did not 
comply with §4.2.4 of the GCGC 8 (Werder et al. 2005). The German parliament was quite 
unsatisfied with the companies’ resistance regarding §4.2.4 of the GCGC. Thus, in 2005 they 
implemented the VorstOG, which became effective in 2006.  
According to the VorstOG each stock listed company is now obliged to disclose 
individualized information on executive compensation in the notes of their financial 
statements differentiated into fixed and variable components, as well as components with 
long-term incentives. Henn et al. (2009) summarize that, due to the implementation of the 
VorstOG, German legislation was extended by (1) the mandatory disclosure of stock options 
and (2) the mandatory compensation disclosure by name.  
With the implementation of the VorstOG several German lawyers and politicians postulated 
that the “new” mandatory disclosure of executive compensation could serve as an instrument 
to improve the representation of shareholders’ interests in the compensation setting process. 
Furthermore, higher transparency, especially on an individualized level, could cause an 
outrage constraint towards managers not to request an inappropriately high remuneration. On 
top of this companies paying a relatively high level of executive compensation are likely to be 
7 From then on the code was reviewed annually.  
8 Werder et al. (2005) observe companies’ compliance from 2002 until 2004. 
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in the focus of the media. Media attention in turn could exert public pressure on those 
companies which currently pay relatively high compensation packages. Next, based on the 
current literature we are going to stress the stated approaches and develop two hypotheses on 
the potential effects of the VorstOG on German executive compensation. 
 
3 Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Disclosure obligations as a monitoring tool for shareholders 
It is often stated that greater compensation transparency should motivate the (supervisory) 
board members to serve the purpose for which the board was originally created, namely to set 
the executive compensation in the shareholders’ interest. Thus, a main function of mandatory 
disclosure laws is to enhance a board’s effort in designing efficient management contracts. 
The efficient design of executive compensation in turn will minimize agency costs. (Vesper-
Gräske (2010), Lo (2003), Alarie (2003)). 
By analyzing the effects of new disclosure rules in America9 for instance, Murphy (1996) 
detects empirically that firms adopt compensation packages that reduce realized levels of 
compensation. 
Andjelkovic et al. (2002) postulate that due to the announcement of new publication 
obligations in New Zealand directors should be motivated to fulfill more actively the task of 
designing an efficient monitoring of executive pay. Indeed, the authors find empirically that in 
response to new disclosure requirements firms, or their directors, introduce reforms such as 
the implementation of a remuneration committee or stock/option incentive pay scheme in 
order to enhance the efficiency of executive compensation.  
Accordingly, Lo (2003) formulates a “governance improvement hypothesis” which argues 
that extensive compensation disclosures could improve compensation contracts by reducing 
frictions between shareholders and managers. Using American data the author indeed 
estimates that the expansion of compensation disclosure results in value-increasing 
governance improvements10.  
Craighead (2004) et al. find that in the absence of disclosure obligations pay-sensitivity in 
widely held firms is lower than in closely held firms. After the implementation of mandated 
disclosure the performance-related part of executive compensation increases more in widely 
held firms than in closely held firms. Especially in cases of widely held companies (where 
monitoring is more difficult) shareholders face high cost in order to understand and influence 
9 In 1992 companies were required to report the value of options granted to the CEO during the year. 
10 Lo (2003) shows that companies lobbying for disclosure obligations experienced high stock returns. However, 
companies lobbying against disclosure regulations experienced an even higher improvement of firm performance 
relative to control firms.  
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the incentive structure of compensation packages. Thus, the implementation of disclosure 
obligations improved the representation of shareholders’ interests especially in cases where 
monitoring is more difficult.  
These studies provide international evidence that stricter publication obligations lead to 
shareholders’ interests being more likely to be reflected in compensation packages – partly 
because the supervisory boards are now more actively engaged in efficient contract design.11  
According to German legislation the primary objective of the VorstOG is to assure the 
possibility of identifying whether German management compensation is reasonable. The 
degree of reasonableness – rather loosely defined – depends on the manager’s tasks as well as 
the company’s economic condition. The German parliament explicitly stated that publication 
obligations are particularly important for shareholders (Deutscher Bundestag 2005) and are 
assumed to improve investors’ protection.  
As mentioned earlier, the German two tier board system is based on a supervisory board that 
autonomously determines executive compensation. The annual general meeting is the only 
point in time when supervisory board members might have to justify their compensation 
decision before the shareholders. Prior to the introduction of VorstOG, the only information 
available to shareholders was the aggregated sum of executive compensation with no 
indication of variable versus fixed components or the distribution of the total amount between 
the members of the management board.  
With the implementation of the VorstOG several German lawyers expected improved 
opportunities to evaluate the adequacy of the design and level of the current system of 
executive compensation. This may be realized by improving shareholders’ monitoring 
possibilities, especially regarding the supervisory board members’ duty to set reasonable and 
efficient executive compensation (Baums 2005, Hoffmann-Becking 2005, Fleischer 2005). 
Thus, Baums (2005) regards mandatory disclosure rules as a monitoring tool.  
 
Summarizing, one possible intention of the VorstOG is to put supervisory boards under 
pressure to adjust inadequate compensation packages in order to serve the interests of the 
shareholders12. However, aside of closer monitoring by shareholders the following concept of 
11 There are several studies analyzing the impact of firms’ negative media coverage (concerning CEO pay 
packages) and subsequent shareholder voting on say-on-pay resolutions. A recent study of Hooghiemstra et al. 
(2015) for example shows that negative media attention significantly affects subsequent shareholder discontent 
over say on pay. These results underline that shareholders’ willingness to criticize and thus influence 
management compensation depends largely on the degree of information they receive about the supervisory 
board’s decisions (either via media or directly via annual reports).  
12 Supervisory board members could fear shareholders’ tools such as the inducement of their dismissal, the 
refusal of their reappointment or in the worst case financial penalties (Vesper-Gräske, 2010). 
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an “outrage constraint” might explain another leveling mechanism on executive compensation 
if such remuneration levels become more transparent.  
 
Outrage constraint due to higher transparency  
In contrast to standard principal agent theory Bebchuk and Fried (2004) emphasize the role of 
managerial power as an explanation for inefficient contracts between agents and principals 
and the possibility of managers to influence their own pay arrangements13. However, so called 
“outrage constraints” are able to limit a managers’ rent maximization and the authors mention 
three reasons for the effects of outrage constraints:  
Firstly, institutional investors may think due to outrageous compensation arrangements that 
executives are insensitive to shareholders’ interests. Thus, in the event of a hostile takeover or 
proxy fight, investors might be less motivated to support managers.  
Secondly, regarding future market career prospects and current business dealings with 
outsiders, managers have an interest in avoiding reputational losses due to outrageous 
compensation arrangements.  
Thirdly, social and psychological factors – such as criticism or ridicule from social or 
professional groups – discourage managers from adopting outrageous compensation 
arrangements.  
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) summarize that “for executives to be adversely affected in a 
material way, outrage must spread among those outsiders whose views matter most to them: 
the institutional investor community, the business media, and social and professional groups” 
(Bebchuk and Fried (2004, 66)). Similarly, organizational behavior research states that due to 
self-serving motivation individuals tend to be unfair in reallocating resources. However, 
individuals change their self-serving behavior in cases where their allocation decisions were 
made public (Diekmann, 1997). 
Dyck and Zingales (2002) empirically focus on the effect of media pressure on managers to 
behave according to social norms. They state that media attention affects managers’ 
reputations not only in the eyes of shareholders and future employers but also in the eyes of 
family, friends and professional associates. Thus, the responsiveness of managers to 
13 The idea of managers influencing their own compensation can certainly be applied to the German corporate 
governance system. Although the two tier system implements supervisory boards as an autonomous institution 
responsible for management compensation, literature provides evidence of the supervisory boards’ inefficiency 
(i.e. Oehmichen et al. (2014), Kramarz and Thesmar (2013), Andres et al. (2013)). Particularly in cases where 
board members have friendly relationships (interlocking boards) it is likely that managers will indirectly receive 
managerial power to influence their own pay arrangements.   
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environmental issues – which they examine empirically14 – is partly due to concern about 
their public image. Kuhnen and Niessen (2012) on the other hand investigate the direct impact 
of public opinion on executive compensation in America and find empirical evidence that 
public opinion influences a firms’ decision on the composition of executive compensation. 
Subsequent to negative press coverage of CEO compensation, firms adjust the level and 
structure of executive compensation15 and this effect intensifies in firms having executives 
with stronger reputational concerns. Alissa (2015) examines empirically the compensation-
based board response to shareholders’ dissatisfaction16. He argues that, assuming 
shareholders’ dissatisfaction damages the managers’ reputations, managers might have an 
incentive to avoid further shareholder dissatisfaction by systematically reducing excess pay. 
However, a significant systematic pay-based reaction only occurs in cases of poor firm 
performance17.  
Häring and Douglas (2012) provide evidence for the management compensation reducing 
effect of an outrage constraint by presenting a German example from the financial crisis. 
Although the economy was going through a financially difficult period, executives still 
received high compensation packages. For obvious reasons this caused outrage which made 
the CEO of Deutsche Bank, Josef Ackermann, “voluntarily” waive his bonus shortly before 
the bank announced a record loss in 2008. Similar behavior by U.S. American CEOs has been 
observed as well. 
Detailed disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation lead to higher transparency 
and the general public receives the necessary information on compensation arrangements 
which could possibly induce outrage. Thus, Bebchuk and Fried (2004, 192) state that “the 
greater outsiders’ understanding of compensation arrangements, the tighter the outrage 
constraint”18.  
Applied to the German context, several German lawyers hypothesized that disclosure of 
executive compensation by name might prevent executives from postulating inappropriately 
high compensation packages and therefore lead to a leveling effect of total compensation. 
14 The authors use international data. 
15 They observe a reduction in option pay and an increase in other compensation components such that overall 
compensation does not change.  
16 Measurement of dissatisfaction is possible due to the implementation of the Say on Pay regulation in the UK 
in 2002 that allows shareholders to vote against a firm’s Directors’ Remuneration Report. 
17 Thus, boards respond selectively to shareholders’ dissatisfaction when there is poor performance. Alissa 
(2015) mentions two potential reasons for the lack of evidence in cases where performance is not bad: Firstly, 
the remuneration board might fear the loss of a valuable CEO in cases of wage reduction. Secondly, 
shareholders’ dissatisfaction may influence certain elements of compensation which do not capture pay levels.  
18 However, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) point out that disclosure only succeeds in constraining compensation 
effectively if the information is available to more than just a selected group.  
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(Baums 2005, Hoffmann-Becking 2005, Fleischer 2005). Hoffmann-Becking (2005) and 
Hirte (2003) point to the particular sensitivity in Germany to high compensation levels 
(probably of higher relevance than e.g. in the U.S.) which might even intensify the 
disciplining effect of an outrage constraint in the German context. According to Baums 
(2005) disclosure partly serves as a “prevention tool” that discourages executives from 
claiming inappropriately high compensation packages, such that the individual compensation 
disclosure by name might have a leveling effect on inappropriately high compensation levels.    
 
So far we have described two mechanisms which both predict a leveling effect of stricter 
publication obligations on executive compensation. On the one hand, we claimed that 
disclosure obligations might serve as a monitoring tool for shareholders which might motivate 
supervisory board members to adopt executive compensation that reflects the shareholders’ 
interests. On the other hand, there might be an outrage constraint exerting pressure on 
executives which could discourage them from claiming inappropriately high compensation 
levels. Not least, it might well be that both mechanisms occur simultaneously. Thus we 
hypothesize: 
 
H1: Higher transparency concerning executive compensation due to implementation of the 
VorstOG might intensify shareholders’ possibilities in monitoring the supervisory board’s 
compensation setting and/or an outrage constraint on managers. Therefore the 
implementation of the VorstOG should have a leveling (negative) impact on total (excessive) 
compensation.   
 
Sensationalism – the public tends to focus on high compensation levels 
As mentioned above, recent literature discusses the impact of media on corporate governance. 
Not only outsiders with particular interests and relations to companies, but also the media 
receive better information on executive compensation as a result of stricter disclosure 
obligations. Taking into account that shareholders’ willingness to criticize and thus influence 
management compensation depends largely on the degree of information they receive, media 
on the one hand serves as an additional instrument for reporting governance issues. That in 
turn may intensify the former mentioned mechanism of disclosure obligations as a monitoring 
tool (Hooghiemstra et al. (2015)). On the other hand, negative media coverage of executive 
compensation could damage the executives’ reputation and thus set up an outrage constraint 
as discussed above.  
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Besides this, there is evidence that media tend to focus on companies paying a particularly 
high level of executive compensation. For instance, Core et al. (2008) showed empirically that 
negative press coverage on management compensation is related to the level of compensation, 
in particular the excessive part of compensation. Similarly, Chen et al. (2013) provide 
evidence that media coverage in China is much wider for firms with high executive 
compensation. One reason for this phenomenon could be the preference of the press for 
engaging in sensationalism. The higher the gap between average worker wages and executive 
compensation, the more spectacular the news19.   
Accordingly, companies in the upper part of compensation distribution are more likely to 
receive public attention than companies with a relatively low compensation level. This 
hypothesis is probably particularly relevant for Germany, where high income levels are 
always considered suspicious by some people, irrespective of the performance and 
responsibility of CEOs. The implementation of the VorstOG is explicitly associated with 
higher transparency and could therefore cause an intensification of this phenomenon. Vesper-
Gräske (2010) postulates an implicit intention of the VorstOG to limit high executive 
compensation by means of media publicity. Consequently, there might be higher public 
pressure, especially in the upper part of compensation distribution due to new publication 
obligations.  
Thus we formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: Companies in the upper part of the compensation distribution are more likely to be the 
focus of media attention and thus experience higher media pressure. Consequently, the effect 
of higher publication obligations on compensation levels should be stronger in the upper part 
of the compensation distribution. 
 
So far we would expect a negative impact of publication obligations on (inappropriately high) 
management compensation and thus a positive governance mechanism. However, the 
literature also critically discusses a possible increase in compensation level due to stricter 
publication obligations. Higher transparency and thus more detailed information about a rival 
company’s compensation might justify a higher pay level. The so called “ratcheting-up” effect 
19 Hooghiemstra et al. (2015) differentiate between media coverage in the financial and business press and media 
coverage in the general press. Thus, depending on the type of press, media could serve either as an information 
intermediary or as an instrument of entertainment. Core et al. (2008) support the sensationalism argument by 
showing that the press focuses negative attention on executives with particular large option exercises.  
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describes an inflationary growth of executive compensation because boards might tend to set 
executive remuneration at a level that is slightly above the average in their industry.  
There is much debate as to whether this effect is efficient or not. On the one hand, 
benchmarking could lead to an inefficient increase in executive pay in cases where 
remuneration is orientated toward the compensation paid at other companies, but neglecting 
many of the specific circumstances confronting a particular firm (Alarie 2003). On the other 
hand, benchmarking could serve as an efficient mechanism to detect the reservation wage in 
order to get the best managers (Bizjak et al. (2008))20. However, Bizjak et al. (2011) report 
that firms (opportunistically) tend to target pay at higher percentiles than the median of the 
peer group or simply favor peer firms with higher compensation levels. Even after changes in 
disclosure regulation in the US in 200621, which required American companies to disclose 
their compensation to peer group members, Faulkender et al. (2013) find that strategic peer 
benchmarking did not disappear and was sometimes even intensified.  
Besides the evidence for an inflationary effect of peer benchmarking on management 
compensation in general there is (to our best knowledge) no empirical evidence for a positive 
causal connection between mandatory compensation disclosure and executive 
compensation22. Although Perry and Zenner (2001) state that the real compensation levels 
increased dramatically in the period following compensation disclosure obligations in the US, 
the authors admit that the rise in stock option grants contributes to a large degree to these 
increases. Nevertheless, the conclusion of the authors is that executive compensation did not 
decline at all.   
Finally, Baums (2005) doubts that information on rival companies’ remuneration and thus the 
inflationary effect of peer benchmarking is a consequence of the implementation of 
publication obligations. He argues that experts of executive compensation consulting firms, 
which usually consult remuneration committees in the US, are well aware of competitors’ 
remuneration systems, even without mandatory publication obligations. The same is true for 
Germany and the relevance of a ratcheting-up effect of executive compensation due to 
publication obligations might be limited for other reasons.  
20 Indeed, the authors find out empirically that benchmarking and the use of peer groups is widespread in setting 
management compensation. In detail they show that executives receiving compensation packages below the 
median experience a larger increase in compensation than executives receiving compensation packages above 
the peer group median. Furthermore, the authors find evidence that the increase in compensation from below to 
above average is not systematically associated with poor corporate governance.  
21 Implementation of the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule   
22 In a recent working paper Balsam et al. (2015) analyze the effect of adopting International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) on executive compensation. They show that after IFRS adoption executive pay increases 
significantly. However, by focusing on the impact of general IFRS adoption and not on compensation disclosure 
obligations these results must be seen in another context and are not contradictory to our argumentation.  
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4 Data and identification strategy 
4.1 Identification Strategy 
The aim of our analysis it to evaluate the impact of a natural experiment, in particular the 
implementation of the VorstOG, on the level of executive compensation. A standard approach 
in program evaluation is the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator.  Basically, a DID 
approach compares the impact of a “treatment” (in our case the policy intervention) before 
and after the treatment by simultaneously considering a cross-sectional component. The cross-
sectional component is provided by a basic differentiation between a so called treatment 
group and a control group. In our case the treatment group represents the group of companies 
which are affected by the policy change. That is the group of companies which did not 
voluntarily disclose the executive compensation before the implementation of the VorstOG. 
Consequently, the group of controls is defined by companies which disclosed executive 
compensation voluntarily even before it became mandatory by law. Now the basic idea is to 
estimate the change experienced by the treatment group adjusted by the change realized by 
the control group before and after the treatment. 
Thus, in the following we will compare the level of executive remuneration before and after 
the implementation of the VorstOG, between companies which did not voluntarily disclose 
(treatment group) and companies which had already voluntarily disclosed (control group) 
remuneration before this became mandatory.  
Fortunately we are able to differentiate between treatment and control group by using 
information from the declaration of compliance to the GCGC. Thus, the sample forming our 
treatment group consists of those firms which did not comply with §4.2.4 of the GCGC in 
2005. As mentioned earlier, these are companies which refused to disclose executive 
compensation components on a differentiated and individualized level. The pre-reform 
cohorts consist of observations from before 2005 (including 2005)23. Since the VorstOG 
became effective in 2006 the post-reform cohort is represented by observations after 2005.  
 
4.2 Econometric model 
The standard DID estimator calculates the average effect of the intervention on the treatment 
group24 (Athey and Imbens (2006)). In order to do so it is necessary to calculate the 
counterfactual outcome of the treatment group. This is the outcome that the treatment group 
23 Due to data restrictions we assume that companies which did not comply in 2005 with paragraph 4.2.4 GCGC 
also did not comply with the same paragraph in previous years. 
24 Given that the common trend assumption and independence assumption is fulfilled. Note that result depends 
on scaling of the outcome.  
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would have achieved if the treatment group had not been treated. Once the counterfactual 
outcome is calculated it has to be subtracted from the post treatment outcome of the treatment 
group in order to identify the treatment effect on the treated. Given the common trend and 
independence assumption is fulfilled the counterfactual situation can be easily calculated. 
Therefore we assume that 𝐸𝐸(𝑦𝑦𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) represents the conditional expected outcome, whereas the 
index 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 indicates whether the outcome is realized by the treatment group (𝐺𝐺 = 1) or not (𝐺𝐺 = 0) and simultaneously indicates the time period which is either the post treatment 
period (𝐺𝐺 = 1) or not (𝐺𝐺 = 0). The expected value of a counterfactual outcome is denoted by  
𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁 ). Formally the counterfactual expected value of the treatment group’s outcome 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑁𝑁 ) 
is defined as follows: 
 
 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌11𝑁𝑁) = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌10) + 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌01) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌00) ( 1 ) 
 
The DID effect can then be computed by25: 
 
 Δ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌11) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌11𝑁𝑁) ( 2 ) 
 
Aside of the general effect, in several cases it might be of interest to learn more about a 
particular treatment effect, especially when the effect of an intervention might differ across 
individuals or quantiles. With regard to the current research question it might well be the case 
that the implementation of the VorstOG has different effects on executive compensation 
depending on the quantiles of the distribution which are examined. Therefore, the Quantile-
DID (QDID)26 approach is used, which applies the standard DID approach to each quantile 
rather than to the mean (Athey and Imbens 2006).  
In order to calculate treatment effects on different quantiles instead of at the mean we need to 
consider the conditional distribution function of our outcome variable, 𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(𝑦𝑦). Again, the 
index 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 differentiates between treatment and control group, respectively between post and 
pre-treatment. Within a QDID approach it is now necessary to fix a certain quantile 𝜏𝜏′  for a 
specific outcome 𝑦𝑦′ depending on the conditional distribution of the pre-treatment group 
(𝐹𝐹10(𝑦𝑦′ )) (see Figure 1). Based on this quantile the counterfactual outcome distribution of the 
treatment group (𝐹𝐹11𝑁𝑁 (𝑦𝑦)) will be computed. Similarly to the standard DID this is done by 
adding the difference between  𝐹𝐹01(𝑦𝑦) and 𝐹𝐹00(𝑦𝑦) to 𝐹𝐹10(𝑦𝑦) for a particular quantile τ′. 
25 This difference is equivalent to (𝐸𝐸(y11) − E(y01)) − (E(y10) − E(y00)) which perhaps more intuitively refers 
to the idea of a difference-in-differences estimator. 
26 Also called non-linear DID method 
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Formally this can be expressed by using inverse distribution functions (also known as quantile 
functions), such that: 
 
 FY,11−1N(𝜏𝜏′) = FY,10−1 (𝜏𝜏′) + �FY,01−1 (𝜏𝜏′) − FY,00−1 (𝜏𝜏′)� ( 3 ) 
 
Figure 1 shows that the treatment effect Δ𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 finally results in the difference between the 
actual and the counterfactual distribution of the treatment group on a certain quantile 𝜏𝜏′  
 
 Δ𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = FY,11−1 (𝜏𝜏′) − FY,11−1N(𝜏𝜏′) ( 4 ) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Quantile Diff in Diff – Treatment Effect 
Only post-treatment outcome distribution functions are shown;  𝐅𝐅𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏(𝐲𝐲) represents conditional distribution of y of the post-
treatment group; 𝐅𝐅𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝐍𝐍 (𝐲𝐲) represents counterfactual conditional distribution of y of the post-treatment group; 𝐅𝐅𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏(𝐲𝐲) represents 
conditional distribution of y of the post-control group.  
 
The treatment effect at the 𝜏𝜏′-quantile is Δ𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = θ𝜏𝜏′  and can be easily estimated using 
standard quantile regression27 by application of the following specification 
 
 FY−1(𝜏𝜏′) = α𝜏𝜏′ + β𝜏𝜏′T + η𝜏𝜏′G + θ𝜏𝜏′GT + 𝐗𝐗′𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏′ ( 5 ) 
 
The explanatory variables 𝐺𝐺 and 𝐺𝐺 correspond to the index description definition explained 
above. The vector 𝐗𝐗′ represents a set of controls. Thus the QDID approach compares 
27 Koenker and Basset (1978); Chamberlain, G. (1994), Koenker, R. (2005) 
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individuals across both groups and time periods according to their specific quantile (Athey 
and Imbens 2006)28. 
Unfortunately, standard quantile regression, often referred to as conditional quantile 
regression, only provides the effect of changes in an explanatory variable on the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficients is only valid 
for the corresponding quantile of the distribution which is defined by the covariates 
(conditional distribution)29. In the context of this study this means that the estimated treatment 
effect, for example at the median, represents the treatment effect for companies that pay the 
median compensation which is defined by whatever covariates we include in the model 
(Porter, 2015). Thus the estimated treatment effect of disclosure obligations using conditional 
quantile regression represents the treatment effect within a group, where the “group” consists 
of companies who share the same values of the covariates.    
However, empirical researchers are primarily interested in understanding the effect of a 
change in an explanatory variable on the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable. 
That is the treatment effect on a certain quantile of the overall compensation distribution. 
Especially in cases of evaluating policy interventions quantile effects for an unconditional 
population might be more interesting. 
Thus, following Havnes and Mogstad (2015) we extend the idea of the QDID approach 
explained above to an unconditional quantile DID approach. Basically, this approach uses the 
concepts of influence functions (IF)30 respectively recentered  influence function (RIF) in the 
manner of Firpo et al. (2009) and adapts this technique to a DID framework.  
Firpo et al. (2009) developed the RIF regression model which in the case of quantile analysis 
can be interpreted as unconditional quantile regression. The main idea is to evaluate the 
impact of changes in the explanatory variable on the unconditional distribution of the 
dependent variable. To do so we first need to transform the dependent variable into the RIF 
such that we can run a regression of the RIF on the explanatory variables. The RIF is defined 
as the sum of the IF and the value of the dependent variable at the 𝜏𝜏th quantile (𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏) such that:  
 
28 In contrast to standard DID the QDID framework makes independence of explanatory variables necessary (the 
underlying distribution of unobservable characteristics must be identical in all subpopulations). Restriction on 
data is that the transformation 𝑘𝑘𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄(𝑦𝑦) = 𝑦𝑦 + Δ𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is monotone. Furthermore the identifying assumption 
depends on monotonic transformations of the outcome variable (Athey and Imbens 2002). 
29 In contrast to standard OLS regression an estimated coefficient β𝜏𝜏 from a conditional quantile regression is 
generally different from the estimated coefficient measuring the effect of changing an 𝑋𝑋-variable on the 𝜏𝜏th 
quantile of the unconditional distribution of 𝑦𝑦 (Fripo et al. 2009).  
30 The influence function estimates the marginal effect of an observation on the value of a statistic. The influence 
function is frequently used in the literature on robust estimation as a measure of robustness to outliers. 
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 𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹�𝑌𝑌; 𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏,𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦� = 𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏 + 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹(𝑌𝑌; 𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏,𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦) ( 6 ) 
 
In a next step we will model the conditional expectation of the RIF as a linear function of the 
explanatory variables 𝑋𝑋 such that we can run simple OLS in order to estimate the coefficient 
𝛽𝛽 in an unconditional quantile regression framework. 
 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹�𝑌𝑌; 𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏,𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦��𝑋𝑋� = 𝑋𝑋′𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀 ( 7 ) 
 
Firpo et al. (2009) showed that the average derivative of this unconditional quantile regression 
provides the marginal effect on the unconditional quantile of a small location shift in the 
distribution of covariates ceteris paribus. Thus, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients 
is similar to the interpretation of OLS estimates. Due to the transformation of the dependent 
variable into the RIF without considering any covariates the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients is independent of covariates – or “unconditional”, so to speak. 
As already mentioned, Havnes and Mogstad (2015) used the concept of RIF regression and 
extended it to the DID context. Similar to QDID, it is necessary to construct a counterfactual 
distribution of the post-treatment output of the treated group. Thus, in order to identify 𝐹𝐹11𝑁𝑁 (𝑦𝑦) 
in the RIF-DID context the model adds to the 𝐹𝐹10(𝑦𝑦) distribution the difference of the 
distributions of 𝐹𝐹01(𝑦𝑦) and 𝐹𝐹00(𝑦𝑦) such that: 
 
 𝐹𝐹11𝑁𝑁 (𝑦𝑦) = 𝐹𝐹10(𝑦𝑦) + �𝐹𝐹01(𝑦𝑦) − 𝐹𝐹00(𝑦𝑦)� ( 8 ) 
 
Consequently the treatment effect ∆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 results by subtracting 𝐹𝐹11𝑁𝑁 (𝑦𝑦) from 𝐹𝐹11(𝑦𝑦) as 
can be seen in Figure 2.  
 
 ∆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐹𝐹11(𝑦𝑦) − 𝐹𝐹11𝑁𝑁 (𝑦𝑦) ( 9 ) 
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Figure 2: RIF- Diff in Diff – Treatment Effect 
Only post-treatment outcome distribution functions are shown;  𝐅𝐅𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏(𝐲𝐲) represents conditional distribution of y of the post-
treatment group; 𝐅𝐅𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝐍𝐍 (𝐲𝐲) represents counterfactual conditional distribution of y of the post-treatment group; 𝐅𝐅𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟏(𝐲𝐲) represents 
conditional distribution of y of the post-control group.  
 
The unconditional treatment effect  ∆𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = δτ can then be calculated by estimating 
the following specification via RIF regression.  
 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹�𝑌𝑌; 𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏,𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦��𝑋𝑋� = α𝜏𝜏 + β𝜏𝜏T + η𝜏𝜏G + δτGT + 𝐗𝐗′𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏 ( 10 ) 
 
Similar to the standard DID31 approach, there are also underlying identifying assumptions for 
non-linear DID methods. In the QDID framework, for example, the common trend 
assumption in mean earnings in the absence of the treatment needs to be fulfilled. That means 
that given a certain quantile 𝑞𝑞𝜏𝜏′  the change in the outcome variable for the treatment group 
(from before to after treatment period) would have been the same as for the control group if 
the treatment group had not been treated.  
In contrast to this, the common trend assumption in the RIF-DID context is slightly less 
restrictive. There it is only necessary that the change in population shares (from before to after 
treatment period) around a certain 𝑦𝑦′ would have been the same as for the control group if the 
treatment group had not been treated (Havnes and Mogstad (2015)). 
 
31  In comparison to standard DID the non-linear DID approaches are invariant to monotonic transformation of 
the outcome.   
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4.3 Data 
In order to evaluate the effect of the implementation of mandatory publication obligations in 
Germany on executive compensation we use a composed dataset of 84 German companies 
which are listed on the Prime Standard segment of the German Stock Exchange32. The dataset 
covers the periods from 2002 to 2011 (unbalanced) resulting in a total number of 762 
observations33. Data on the average executive compensation per head is provided by 
Kienbaum Consulting. Furthermore, we combine the Kienbaum dataset with the Dafne 
database compiled by Bureau van Dijk. This dataset contains information on firm financials 
and firm employment which will serve as control variables.  Beside this we use self-collected 
data on the disclosure practices of the companies. For this purpose we evaluated the annual 
declaration of compliance for the financial year 2005. In detail we noted which companies 
complied voluntarily and self-obliged with paragraph 4.2.4 of the German Corporate 
Governance Code in 2005 and which companies did not.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our data separated into control and treatment group. 
Accordingly we observe 51 (484 firm-years) companies which refuse to apply the 
recommendation of paragraph 4.2.4 of the Corporate Governance Code and thus according to 
our identification strategy serve as the treatment group. Consequently, the 33 (278 firm-years) 
remaining companies that had already complied with paragraph 4.2.4 before the 
implementation of mandatory publication obligations became effective therefore form the 
control group.  
Our dependent variable 𝑦𝑦 is the logarithm of the average total compensation per head 
(lnTotComp). The average total executive compensation per head is €1.5m  in the control 
group and greater than the corresponding amount of €1.05m  for the treatment group. As the 
standard deviation for the average total compensation in the control group is also higher we 
know that the difference in total compensation between treatment and control group is rather 
driven by outliers than by systematic differences.  
Both estimation techniques, QDID and RIFF-DID, use the same explanatory variables. 
Referring to equations (5) and (10) the variable 𝐺𝐺 represents a dummy variable assuming unit 
value if the observation is from the year 2006 onwards (including the year 2006) and zero if 
the observation belongs to the pre-treatment period. The dummy variable G indicates whether 
an observation belongs to the treatment group (unit value) or to the control group. The 
(quantile) treatment effect will be represented by the coefficient θτ and δτ respectively. 
32 Most of the companies have been quoted either on the DAX or the MDAX. 
33 We only kept observations for which we have information before and after the treatment. 
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As mentioned earlier,  𝐗𝐗′ represents a vector of controls. In particular, we control for size 
effects by using the log of employment (lnEmploy). Table 1 shows that the average company 
size of the control group is 65.841 employees and therefore these firms are much larger than 
those from the control group, which employ on average 17.019 persons. Similar to the 
dependent variable, the standard deviation of the mean value for Employ is much higher in the 
control group than in the treatment group. Thus, we conclude that this difference in size is 
mostly driven by some extremely large companies in the control group (for example 
Volkswagen AG). This makes clear that in order to estimate a causal treatment effect it is 
important to control for possible size effects. 
The impact of economic performance is considered by using return on equity (ROE) as an 
explanatory variable. The average return on equity for both groups varies between 7 and 8 
percent. Furthermore, we control for an asymmetry in punishing managers for bad firm 
decisions and remunerating managers for good firm decisions by implementing a dummy 
variable that assumes unit value if the balance sheet total is positive and zero otherwise 
(DProfit). More than 80 percent of the overall observations include companies which have a 
positive balance sheet total. Additionally, we control for the asymmetric impact of 
performance on compensation by interacting DProfit with ROE . The average return on equity 
for companies having a positive balance sheet total (12.53%) is slightly higher in the 
treatment group than the corresponding value for the control group (10.38%).  As we use an 
unbalanced panel for the periods between 2002 and 2011 we control for time effects by 
implementing time dummies. We also control for industry effects by using industry 
dummies34. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for 2002 - 2011 for treatment and control groups  
 Variable N Mean Se Min Max  
Control group TotComp 278 1557 1413 114.7 9205  (G = 0) ROE 278 7.107 18.04 -146.0 45.93  
 Employ 278 65841 111485 3 502763  
 DProfit 278 0.838 0.369 0 1  
 intDProfitROE 278 10.38 8.964 0 45.93  
        
Treatment Group TotComp 484 1048 1076 106.2 7777  (G = 1) ROE 484 8.097 22.59 -121.0 59.45  
 Employ 484 17019 47088 16 372056  
 DProfit 484 0.841 0.366 0 1  
 intDProfitROE 484 12.53 11.67 0 59.45  
TotComp represents total per head executive compensation in thousand Euros. (84 companies from 2002 to 2011) 
34 WZ2008 first stage (“Klassifikation der Wirtschaftszweige“ from Statistisches Bundesamt) 
 
 
                                                          
22 
 
5 Results 
As described in equations (5) and (10) we run the QDID and the RIF-DID estimator on 
identical specifications such that the set of independent variables and the number of 
observations is the same for both models.  
Figure 3 represents the estimated treatment effects for both models. The horizontal consists of 
quantiles ranging from the 10th to 90th quantile and the vertical represents the logarithm of the 
total compensation per head. Thus, the graph represents the percentage effect of the 
implementation of the VorstOG on the different quantiles of the compensation distribution.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Quantile treatment effect of the VorstOG on the log level of executive compensation per head 
The plotted QTE corresponds to the estimator for 𝛉𝛉𝛕𝛕 (𝛅𝛅𝛕𝛕) in equation (5) (equation (10)) in the QDID (RIFF-DID) case. As it 
is not recommended to push 𝝉𝝉 into the tails too far we only present the QTE at quantiles 01-90. The grey shaded area 
represents a 90% confidence interval based on bootstrap with 200 replications. 
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As presented in Figure 3 the similar shape of both curves (QDID and RIF-DID) indicates that 
our results are robust towards different estimation techniques whereas the point estimates of 
the RIFF-DID estimation are in absolute values higher than those of the QDID model. Both 
estimation techniques show a decreasing trend in the point estimates of the treatment effect 
along the quantiles. This serves as an indicator that the treatment effect differs across 
quantiles such that a quantile regression in general seems to be an adequate estimation 
technique to evaluate the effect of the implementation of VorstOG.  
According to the QDID results, the implementation of the VorstOG caused a decrease of 23 
percent in total compensation if the 65th quantile of the compensation distribution is 
considered and a decrease of 32 percent if the 85th quantile is analyzed. When unconditional 
quantile estimation techniques are used it turns out that the effects are even more extreme. If 
this method is applied in the case of the 65th quantile the VorstOG causes a 37 percent 
decrease in total compensation and for the 85th quantile the estimated treatment effect is a 
decrease of 53 percent in comparison to the control group. 
However, in both cases the estimated effects turn out to be significant only in the upper 
quantiles. Thus, between the 60th and 90th quantile the implementation of publication 
obligations in Germany has a significant negative effect on the total per head executive 
compensation.  
In comparison to companies who already disclosed executive compensation on a detailed 
level voluntarily before the implementation of the VorstOG, companies who did not disclose 
information experienced a decrease in total compensation due to the mandatory changes in 
publication obligations. Thus, the fact that the estimated treatment effect in both models has a 
negative sign (at least at the part of the distribution where it turns out to be significant) 
supports H1. As we described earlier there might be two potential mechanisms which might 
(simultaneously) determine the revealed decrease in total executive compensation. The 
estimated results suggest that stricter publication obligation could possibly serve as an 
instrument to motivate supervisory board members to adopt total compensation schemes in 
accordance with shareholder´ interests. The results also support the notion that, due to an 
outrage constraint, executives might be discouraged from claiming inappropriately high 
compensation packages, resulting in a decrease of total compensation. 
There is no valid interpretation of the impact of the VorstOG on the lower part of the 
compensation distribution – perhaps due to the fact that there is no effect at all?  Thus, the fact 
that the quantile treatment effects only turn out to be significant for the upper part of the 
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compensation distribution supports the earlier discussed assumption that the policy change 
might especially be effective in the case of inappropriately high levels of compensation (H2).  
Besides the fact that the treatment effect is only significantly estimated in the upper part of the 
distribution, the effect itself also increases in terms of absolute values. This might support our 
second hypothesis that media pressure, which mostly focuses on extremely high executive 
compensation, succeeded in having a stronger impact on higher levels of compensation.  
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper reports the results of an empirical study on the effects of the introduction of 
considerably more stringent disclosure requirements on the level of executive compensation. 
The innovative aspect is the comparison of companies which voluntarily followed a 
recommendation of the German Governance Code (before the disclosure became mandatory) 
and published detailed information on executive compensation with others which did not. 
Furthermore, we apply a quantile difference-in-differences model and extend the analysis to 
unconditional quantile regression. Interestingly, the companies which refused to publish data 
before it became mandatory, show a reduction in compensation levels for the upper quantiles. 
Hence, the mandatory requirements to publish detailed information affected remuneration in 
the way that was intended by the legislator.  
Since before the implementation of the VorstOG only the total amount of executive 
compensation was published and not its components, we do not know to which extent the 
decrease in total per head compensation is due to changes in the compensation design. A 
decrease in total compensation could be caused by different mechanisms: Firstly, it could be 
caused by a simple decrease in the fixed part of executive compensation holding other 
variable compensation components constant. Secondly, a decrease in the total level of 
compensation could occur because both fixed and variable parts decreased. Or thirdly (but 
most unlikely), the reason for a total decrease is a decrease in the variable share of 
compensation.  
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